Good book that is also an easy and interesting read. Makes a good argument about the morality of how war has evolved from armies on the field of battle to airplanes dropping bombs from above. The result is that now non-combatants are targeted, which includes women and children. Look at what is currently happening in Gaza! Somehow, dropping a bomb from on high makes war so easy and clean. No need to create a large standing army, instead just build airplanes and find a few pilots to fly them.
The Bomber Mafia: A Dream, a Temptation, and the Longest Night of the Second World War
4.5 4.5 out of 5 stars | 10,640 ratings
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Last update: 01-11-2025
About this item
In The Bomber Mafia: A Dream, a Temptation, and the Longest Night of the Second World War, Malcolm Gladwell, author of New York Times best sellers including Talking to Strangers and host of the podcast Revisionist History, uses original interviews, archival footage, and his trademark insight to weave together the stories of a Dutch genius and his homemade computer, a band of brothers in Central Alabama, a British psychopath, and pyromaniacal chemists at Harvard. As listeners hear these stories unfurl, Gladwell examines one of the greatest moral challenges in modern American history.
Most military thinkers in the years leading up to World War II saw the airplane as an afterthought. But a small band of idealistic strategists had a different view. This “Bomber Mafia” asked: What if precision bombing could, just by taking out critical choke points - industrial or transportation hubs - cripple the enemy and make war far less lethal?
In Revisionist History, Gladwell reexamines moments from the past and asks whether we got it right the first time. In The Bomber Mafia, he employs all the production techniques that make Revisionist History so engaging, stepping back from the bombing of Tokyo, the deadliest night of the war, and asking, “Was it worth it?” The attack was the brainchild of General Curtis LeMay, whose brutal pragmatism and scorched-earth tactics in Japan cost thousands of civilian lives but may have spared more by averting a planned US invasion.
Things might have gone differently had LeMay’s predecessor, General Haywood Hansell, remained in charge. As a key member of the Bomber Mafia, Hansell’s theories of precision bombing had been foiled by bad weather and human error. When he and Curtis LeMay squared off for a leadership handover in the jungles of Guam, LeMay emerged victorious, leading to the darkest night of World War II.
The Bomber Mafia is a riveting tale of persistence, innovation, and the incalculable wages of war.
Top reviews from the United States
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Reviewed in the United States on July 31, 2024Stephen Bang4.0 out of 5 stars
Personalities, technologies, and morality of the WWII bombing
Reviewed in the United States on April 11, 2022
The Bomber Mafia, Malcomb Gladwell
This book tells about the people and the technologies that shaped the U.S. and British bombing campaigns of WWII. But the overarching theme that shows up again and again is the question, what is the moral or ethical way to prosecute a war. I think it fairly presents the dilemmas. The main dilemma is whether to target civilians. This is a timely question, considering the way that Russia is targeting civilians in Ukraine. The book is respectful of most points of view, but has a low tolerance for people {the Bomber Mafia) who commit to a doctrine based on little evidence, and who refuse to change when they see evidence that their doctrine is wrong. Gladwell wrestles with the decisions to firebomb Dresden and many Japanese cities, and the use of the atomic bomb. These were mainly attacks on civilians, and Gladwell is uncomfortable with that. But he recognizes that a land invasion of Japan would have caused enormous casualties on both sides plus a great deal of starvation among Japanese civilians. He notes that LeMay’s superiors, including Truman, did not comprehend what he was doing, and he made decisions of grave consequence with no real supervision. He notes that in 1964 Japan awarded Lemay with their highest medal for work to improve the Japanese defensive air force.
The following paragraphs are a more detailed summary of the book.
After a few introductory pages, we are introduced to Carl L. Norden, inventer of the Norden Bomb Sight – the Mark XV. Many things affect the path of a bomb when it is dropped from high altitude. Mainly, release altitude, aircraft speed, and wind. Oh, and the earth moves some distance as the bomb falls. Norden designed the bomb sight single-handedly, refusing any help. Norden was a devout Christian, and believed that precision bombing, made possible with his bomb sight, would win wars by destroying the machines of war, rather than by killing millions of soldiers or civilians.
Early on, we start learning about the Bomber Mafia. A few pilots (around twelve) who were veterans of World War I reacted to the carnage of trench warfare in that war. They thought that a war could be fought mainly with airplanes with a quicker end and fewer deaths. They were instructors at the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama. At Maxwell, they were as isolated as possible from the rest of the Army, which didn’t think much of airplanes or pilots. They formulated four tenets: 1, the bomber will always get through. 2, attack by daylight. 3, use a bombsight, like Norden’s. 4, bomb from high altitude. One pilot at the Tactical School, Claire Chennault, challenged these tenets, and was thrown out. They didn’t have any of the hardware they were thinking about, and they didn’t have a war, so they did thought experiments. They heard a factory in Pittsburgh that manufactured a critical part of variable-pitch propellors. The factory was badly damaged in a flood, and propellors could not be completed for many months. Aha. If a few critical factories could be destroyed, the enemy could not produce essential arms. The whole industry did not have to be destroyed.
To explain how different Air Corps (or Air Force) culture was, he describes the chapels at West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy. The Air Force Academy cadet chapel looks like seventeen fighter jets aimed at the sky. It is made with aluminum, steel, and stained glass. Nobody had built such a building before, and when finished, it leaked water when it rained. So modifications were made. The Idea is that most things the Air Force does (back then anyway), hasn’t been done before and you just have to do it and then make adjustments where needed. (Before The Bomber Mafia was published, a major – drastic – rebuilding project was started on the cadet chapel, but Gladwell does not mention it, it doesn’t really contribute to his narrative.)
The United States entered World War II and started high altitude, daylight bombing, with the Royal Air Force bombing at night – “area bombing.” In January, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met at Casablanca. Churchill wanted the U.S. to switch to night area bombing. General Hap Arnold summoned General Ira Eaker to Casablanca to change Churchill’s mind. Churchill wasn’t entirely convinced but agreed that the Eighth Air Force would continue with daylight precision bombing a bit longer. The U.K. had a bomber mafioso – a single man – Frederick Lindemann – who set the bombing doctrine for the U.K. He was a very close friend of Churchill, and believed in night area bombing of entire cities. They liked to call it morale bombing. They believed it would destroy the morale of the German people. They had witnessed the failure of bombing to hurt morale in London and other U.K. cities, but they were sure it would be different with bombing German cities. Lindemann said “I define a moral action as one that brings advantage to my friends.” P 71. Lindemann was German born and educated, but he turned on his native country. He had no facts to support his bombing doctrine. Marshall Arthur Harris – Bomber Harris – ran the British bombing command. He implemented Lindemann’s doctrine.
The Bomber Mafia thought they knew a “choke point” in German production. If they could wipe out the ball bearing production, they could prevent the production of any machine that turns. They devised a plan to bomb the ball bearing factories at Schweinfurt. They would simultaneously send some bombers to Regensburg, led by Curtis LeMay, as a diversion. Fog caused the Schweinfurt bombers to take off hours late, so there was no diversion. The Schweinfurt bombers dropped 2000 bombs, and only 80 hit their target. Many bombers were destroyed. It did not impede German war production. This should have taught the Bomber Mafia that high altitude daylight precision bombing would not work, but it didn’t. They tried and failed again a few months later, and did not abandon high altitude daylight precision bombing.
Part 2 of the book shifts to the Pacific Theater. Several of the Marianas Islands were taken, to be used to launch bombing raids on Japan. Guam, Tinian, Saipan. The B-29 was produced with much longer range than the B-17 or B-24, long enough to reach Japan from the Marianas. General Haywood Hansell commanded the 20th Bomber Command in the Marianas in late 1944 until he was relieved in January 1945. (On page 164 it says 20th, on page 168 it says 21st. Probably 21st is correct.) He as a solid member of the Bomber Mafia and committed to high altitude daylight precision bombing. But it wasn’t going to work over Japan because there was a 125 MPH jet stream at the altitude where the B-29s were bombing. It was way too much to ask of the Norden Bomb Sight. Hardly any bombs hit their targets.
Early in the war, scientists at Harvard were working on incendiary bombs. They finally came up with napalm, and napalm bombs were developed and produced. Hansell was ordered to conduct an incendiary raid on a Japanese city. He sent out a feeble raid, and got fired. He was morally opposed to massive incendiary bombing that would kill many civilians. His replacement was Curtis LeMay.
At first, LeMay tried to do high altitude daylight precision bombing. A big problem was clouds. The Norden Bomb Sight requires that the bombardier must be able to see the target. You can’t do precision bombing if the ground is obscured by clouds. (This is on top of the jet stream problem.) Many times, the B-29s were ready to take off, but there were reports or forecasts that the target was cloudy. It’s not clear how they would know that from the Marianas. LeMay came up with a plan all by himself. The bombers would come in at 5,000 feet, at night, with incendiary (napalm) bombs. They did this on March 9-10, 1945. The target was a 15 mile square area. Most of it was burned. There were many deaths, mostly civilian. This was repeated many times in many Japanese cities. Before the Tokyo raid, there was concern about coming in at 5,000 feet. But the Japanese defenses were not designed for bombers at such a low altitude. The book doesn’t mention any bomber losses.
When you go to the Amazon page for the book, most of the reviews that pop up first are 1 or 2 star reviews. We used to be able to write comments to respond to reviews, but Amazon took that feature away. The negative reviews point out a couple of errors and they call it incomplete, not rigorous, lightweight, and plagiarism. There are errors. Gladwell says that B-29s could not launch from Guam because of insufficient tailwind. When takeoff performance is marginal, an airplane always takes off with a headwind. I flew the KC-135A, I know. Suppose takeoff speed is 100 knots and there is a 25 knot tailwind. Then the airplane has to have a ground speed of 125 knots to take off. If there is a 25 knot headwind, the groundspeed only needs to be 75 knots. Isn’t this obvious? I think the book is reasonably complete, covering the important issues. Well it is not real rigorous, it wasn’t intended to be. I don’t know about the plagiarism charge. Some reviewers criticized Gladwell’s treatment of the moral questions. I think he was fair. He didn’t side completely with or against LeMay’s decision to firebomb Japanese cities. He explored the issue. One reviewer recommended Twilight of the Gods by Ian Tolle. I suppose that is a great book, but it is 943 pages.
This book tells about the people and the technologies that shaped the U.S. and British bombing campaigns of WWII. But the overarching theme that shows up again and again is the question, what is the moral or ethical way to prosecute a war. I think it fairly presents the dilemmas. The main dilemma is whether to target civilians. This is a timely question, considering the way that Russia is targeting civilians in Ukraine. The book is respectful of most points of view, but has a low tolerance for people {the Bomber Mafia) who commit to a doctrine based on little evidence, and who refuse to change when they see evidence that their doctrine is wrong. Gladwell wrestles with the decisions to firebomb Dresden and many Japanese cities, and the use of the atomic bomb. These were mainly attacks on civilians, and Gladwell is uncomfortable with that. But he recognizes that a land invasion of Japan would have caused enormous casualties on both sides plus a great deal of starvation among Japanese civilians. He notes that LeMay’s superiors, including Truman, did not comprehend what he was doing, and he made decisions of grave consequence with no real supervision. He notes that in 1964 Japan awarded Lemay with their highest medal for work to improve the Japanese defensive air force.
The following paragraphs are a more detailed summary of the book.
After a few introductory pages, we are introduced to Carl L. Norden, inventer of the Norden Bomb Sight – the Mark XV. Many things affect the path of a bomb when it is dropped from high altitude. Mainly, release altitude, aircraft speed, and wind. Oh, and the earth moves some distance as the bomb falls. Norden designed the bomb sight single-handedly, refusing any help. Norden was a devout Christian, and believed that precision bombing, made possible with his bomb sight, would win wars by destroying the machines of war, rather than by killing millions of soldiers or civilians.
Early on, we start learning about the Bomber Mafia. A few pilots (around twelve) who were veterans of World War I reacted to the carnage of trench warfare in that war. They thought that a war could be fought mainly with airplanes with a quicker end and fewer deaths. They were instructors at the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama. At Maxwell, they were as isolated as possible from the rest of the Army, which didn’t think much of airplanes or pilots. They formulated four tenets: 1, the bomber will always get through. 2, attack by daylight. 3, use a bombsight, like Norden’s. 4, bomb from high altitude. One pilot at the Tactical School, Claire Chennault, challenged these tenets, and was thrown out. They didn’t have any of the hardware they were thinking about, and they didn’t have a war, so they did thought experiments. They heard a factory in Pittsburgh that manufactured a critical part of variable-pitch propellors. The factory was badly damaged in a flood, and propellors could not be completed for many months. Aha. If a few critical factories could be destroyed, the enemy could not produce essential arms. The whole industry did not have to be destroyed.
To explain how different Air Corps (or Air Force) culture was, he describes the chapels at West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy. The Air Force Academy cadet chapel looks like seventeen fighter jets aimed at the sky. It is made with aluminum, steel, and stained glass. Nobody had built such a building before, and when finished, it leaked water when it rained. So modifications were made. The Idea is that most things the Air Force does (back then anyway), hasn’t been done before and you just have to do it and then make adjustments where needed. (Before The Bomber Mafia was published, a major – drastic – rebuilding project was started on the cadet chapel, but Gladwell does not mention it, it doesn’t really contribute to his narrative.)
The United States entered World War II and started high altitude, daylight bombing, with the Royal Air Force bombing at night – “area bombing.” In January, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met at Casablanca. Churchill wanted the U.S. to switch to night area bombing. General Hap Arnold summoned General Ira Eaker to Casablanca to change Churchill’s mind. Churchill wasn’t entirely convinced but agreed that the Eighth Air Force would continue with daylight precision bombing a bit longer. The U.K. had a bomber mafioso – a single man – Frederick Lindemann – who set the bombing doctrine for the U.K. He was a very close friend of Churchill, and believed in night area bombing of entire cities. They liked to call it morale bombing. They believed it would destroy the morale of the German people. They had witnessed the failure of bombing to hurt morale in London and other U.K. cities, but they were sure it would be different with bombing German cities. Lindemann said “I define a moral action as one that brings advantage to my friends.” P 71. Lindemann was German born and educated, but he turned on his native country. He had no facts to support his bombing doctrine. Marshall Arthur Harris – Bomber Harris – ran the British bombing command. He implemented Lindemann’s doctrine.
The Bomber Mafia thought they knew a “choke point” in German production. If they could wipe out the ball bearing production, they could prevent the production of any machine that turns. They devised a plan to bomb the ball bearing factories at Schweinfurt. They would simultaneously send some bombers to Regensburg, led by Curtis LeMay, as a diversion. Fog caused the Schweinfurt bombers to take off hours late, so there was no diversion. The Schweinfurt bombers dropped 2000 bombs, and only 80 hit their target. Many bombers were destroyed. It did not impede German war production. This should have taught the Bomber Mafia that high altitude daylight precision bombing would not work, but it didn’t. They tried and failed again a few months later, and did not abandon high altitude daylight precision bombing.
Part 2 of the book shifts to the Pacific Theater. Several of the Marianas Islands were taken, to be used to launch bombing raids on Japan. Guam, Tinian, Saipan. The B-29 was produced with much longer range than the B-17 or B-24, long enough to reach Japan from the Marianas. General Haywood Hansell commanded the 20th Bomber Command in the Marianas in late 1944 until he was relieved in January 1945. (On page 164 it says 20th, on page 168 it says 21st. Probably 21st is correct.) He as a solid member of the Bomber Mafia and committed to high altitude daylight precision bombing. But it wasn’t going to work over Japan because there was a 125 MPH jet stream at the altitude where the B-29s were bombing. It was way too much to ask of the Norden Bomb Sight. Hardly any bombs hit their targets.
Early in the war, scientists at Harvard were working on incendiary bombs. They finally came up with napalm, and napalm bombs were developed and produced. Hansell was ordered to conduct an incendiary raid on a Japanese city. He sent out a feeble raid, and got fired. He was morally opposed to massive incendiary bombing that would kill many civilians. His replacement was Curtis LeMay.
At first, LeMay tried to do high altitude daylight precision bombing. A big problem was clouds. The Norden Bomb Sight requires that the bombardier must be able to see the target. You can’t do precision bombing if the ground is obscured by clouds. (This is on top of the jet stream problem.) Many times, the B-29s were ready to take off, but there were reports or forecasts that the target was cloudy. It’s not clear how they would know that from the Marianas. LeMay came up with a plan all by himself. The bombers would come in at 5,000 feet, at night, with incendiary (napalm) bombs. They did this on March 9-10, 1945. The target was a 15 mile square area. Most of it was burned. There were many deaths, mostly civilian. This was repeated many times in many Japanese cities. Before the Tokyo raid, there was concern about coming in at 5,000 feet. But the Japanese defenses were not designed for bombers at such a low altitude. The book doesn’t mention any bomber losses.
When you go to the Amazon page for the book, most of the reviews that pop up first are 1 or 2 star reviews. We used to be able to write comments to respond to reviews, but Amazon took that feature away. The negative reviews point out a couple of errors and they call it incomplete, not rigorous, lightweight, and plagiarism. There are errors. Gladwell says that B-29s could not launch from Guam because of insufficient tailwind. When takeoff performance is marginal, an airplane always takes off with a headwind. I flew the KC-135A, I know. Suppose takeoff speed is 100 knots and there is a 25 knot tailwind. Then the airplane has to have a ground speed of 125 knots to take off. If there is a 25 knot headwind, the groundspeed only needs to be 75 knots. Isn’t this obvious? I think the book is reasonably complete, covering the important issues. Well it is not real rigorous, it wasn’t intended to be. I don’t know about the plagiarism charge. Some reviewers criticized Gladwell’s treatment of the moral questions. I think he was fair. He didn’t side completely with or against LeMay’s decision to firebomb Japanese cities. He explored the issue. One reviewer recommended Twilight of the Gods by Ian Tolle. I suppose that is a great book, but it is 943 pages.
The Quantum Entangler5.0 out of 5 stars
Fascinating read
Reviewed in the United States on August 29, 2024
Deep ethical questions presented in an entertaining and accessible book that reads like a novel and stays in your consciousness.
KC Loewen5.0 out of 5 stars
Definitely got a history lesson with this one. Very good
Reviewed in the United States on July 25, 2024
As it turns out the norden bomb site really didn't turn the war like I'd always heard. Sadly napalm did. I learned a lot from this book and it is very well written
John Read5.0 out of 5 stars
Great study of a complex subject
Reviewed in the United States on May 7, 2021
This is a very interesting summary of the concept and execution of American bombing strategies during World War II. However, I think the title may be something of a misnomer: The term "Mafia" seems to imply an evil intent. The thinkers of the "Bomber Mafia" were normal humans trying to defeat an enemy by making the most efficient use of the tools at hand: heavy bombers.
During the inter-war period, the militaries in the United States and Britain thought about how to best use the technologies developed during WWI—principally the ability to bomb distant targets with the heavy bomber. A major objective was to avoid the incredibly bloody and futile static trench warfare of the Great War.
During the 1930s, Americans at Maxwell Field in Alabama formed a Tactical School to ponder this problem. They arrived at the idea that by precision bombing in daylight (when they could see the target) they could destroy critical chokepoints in the enemy's military production that would bring it to a halt and force the enemy to surrender without vast destruction or loss of life. During this period, the Norden bombsight became available, which seemed to make this dream a reality. It was believed that you could place a 500-pound bomb in a pickle barrel from 30,000 feet.
British thinking, led by Air Marshal Arthur “Bomber” Harris, was diametrically opposite to American thinking. After 1940, Harris felt that by indiscriminate bombing of London, the Germans should “reap the whirlwind.” The British believed that by bombing at night with incendiary weapons, you could force the Germans to surrender by destroying the will of the populace to continue. It was also much easier to hit a city than a factory.
The first opportunity to test the American strategic theory came in August, 1943. By destroying the ball-bearing factory at Schweinfurt, Germany, Americans thought they could prevent manufacture of almost all German military hardware, since it all required ball bearings and there were very few ball-bearing factories in Germany. A second large bomber force was to act as a decoy, striking the Messerschmitt fighter factories at Regensburg.
Unfortunately, the German Luftwaffe caused great losses in both the Schweinfurt and Regensburg forces, and the ball-bearing raid was considered a failure. It was followed up by a second raid that was more successful. Interestingly, Albert Speer, the German Minister of Production said in his memoir, “Inside the Third Reich,” that the first Schweinfurt raid was in fact very effective, dropping production of ball bearings by 38 percent. Speer testified that if the attacks on ball-bearing production had continued “armaments production … would have been brought completely to a standstill.” He thought that the “Allies threw away success when it was already in their hands.”
Bomber Harris’ area bombings turned out to be no more successful in bringing the Reich to its knees than did Hitler’s raids on London, although the Allied day-night raids reduced several German cities to rubble.
In the Pacific war against Japan, the Japanese home islands were out of reach of strategic bombing until spring of 1944. B-29s of the XX Bomber Command based in India were able to reach Kyushu, the southernmost island of Japan, by using intermediate refueling bases near Cheng-tu, China. The fuel stored at Cheng-tu had to be brought over the Himalayas from India. It took 12 gallons of gas to bring one gallon to Cheng-tu. My father-in-law was a radar operator who took part in these operations. All participants were well aware of the futility of this bizarre arrangement, but they recognized the importance of keeping Chang Kai-Shek focused on fighting the Japanese and not the Chinese Communists.
Command of XX Bomber Command changed several times, as their operations were not very successful. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs “Hap” Arnold initially named himself Commander to keep it out of the hands of local commanders. After he suffered a heart attack, Brigadier General Heywood “Possum” Hansell took over. General Kenneth Wolfe then shepherded the B-29 through production and initial deployment in May 1944, but was replaced by General Laverne “Blondie” Saunders, who was in turn replaced by General Curtis LeMay. While in India-China, LeMay’s results were no better than Wolfe’s or Saunders’. Daylight precision bombing seemed to be a failure.
LeMay had had some experience with area fire-bombing when he bombed Hankow (now Wuhan), China in December, 1944. My father-in-law participated in that raid as well. They bombed using radar instead of visually. Hankow is at the intersection of several rivers, making a very confusing radar picture. My father-in-law said he thought he had accidently bombed the forces of Chiang-kai Shek, but it turned out to be Japanese forces that he bombed, and he was hailed as a hero.
Finally, in August 1944, the Mariana Islands were secured and the B-29s had an easily supplied base from which they could strike all of Japan. “Possum” Hansell was in charge initially of XXI Bomber Command on the Marianas. Again, precision daylight bombing did not work well. XXI Bomber Command discovered the jet stream, a high-level, very fast air current that in some cases was so powerful that the B-29s’ ground speed was negative, i.e., they were flying backward. Bombing from high altitude did not work because the bombs were blown sideways out of the field of the Norden bomb sight. Curtis LeMay replaced Hansell, in the incident described carefully by Gladwell.
That was the end of daylight precision bombing of Japan. The next target was to be Tokyo. LeMay decided to attack at low altitude, at night, using the newly developed, highly effective napalm. In March, 1945, XXI Bomber Command attacked Tokyo in what Gladwell calls the “Longest Night of the Second World War.” This was to be Bomber Harris doctrine in spades. Gladwell’s description of that night is extremely vivid. He does leave out the little-known fact that one of the on-the-ground participants was 12-year-old Yoko Ono, who survived the firebombing in a special bunker.
Of course the ultimate event in contrast with precision bombing was the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There is very little need for precision when the bomb is going to vaporize the target city.
So you might think, well, the discussion is over. Damage-limiting precision bombing is a failure. Bomber Harris was right. But these days, with bombs guided by global positioning system or lasers, the idea of dropping a 500-pounder into a pickle barrel is no longer fantasy.
Caldwell makes a few technical gaffes that other reviewers have commented on: that the B-29s needed a “tailwind” to get in the air; that both atomic bombs were carried by Enola Gay. I don’t think these are very important compared to the excellent overview of the pursuit, successes, and failures of the strategies.
During the inter-war period, the militaries in the United States and Britain thought about how to best use the technologies developed during WWI—principally the ability to bomb distant targets with the heavy bomber. A major objective was to avoid the incredibly bloody and futile static trench warfare of the Great War.
During the 1930s, Americans at Maxwell Field in Alabama formed a Tactical School to ponder this problem. They arrived at the idea that by precision bombing in daylight (when they could see the target) they could destroy critical chokepoints in the enemy's military production that would bring it to a halt and force the enemy to surrender without vast destruction or loss of life. During this period, the Norden bombsight became available, which seemed to make this dream a reality. It was believed that you could place a 500-pound bomb in a pickle barrel from 30,000 feet.
British thinking, led by Air Marshal Arthur “Bomber” Harris, was diametrically opposite to American thinking. After 1940, Harris felt that by indiscriminate bombing of London, the Germans should “reap the whirlwind.” The British believed that by bombing at night with incendiary weapons, you could force the Germans to surrender by destroying the will of the populace to continue. It was also much easier to hit a city than a factory.
The first opportunity to test the American strategic theory came in August, 1943. By destroying the ball-bearing factory at Schweinfurt, Germany, Americans thought they could prevent manufacture of almost all German military hardware, since it all required ball bearings and there were very few ball-bearing factories in Germany. A second large bomber force was to act as a decoy, striking the Messerschmitt fighter factories at Regensburg.
Unfortunately, the German Luftwaffe caused great losses in both the Schweinfurt and Regensburg forces, and the ball-bearing raid was considered a failure. It was followed up by a second raid that was more successful. Interestingly, Albert Speer, the German Minister of Production said in his memoir, “Inside the Third Reich,” that the first Schweinfurt raid was in fact very effective, dropping production of ball bearings by 38 percent. Speer testified that if the attacks on ball-bearing production had continued “armaments production … would have been brought completely to a standstill.” He thought that the “Allies threw away success when it was already in their hands.”
Bomber Harris’ area bombings turned out to be no more successful in bringing the Reich to its knees than did Hitler’s raids on London, although the Allied day-night raids reduced several German cities to rubble.
In the Pacific war against Japan, the Japanese home islands were out of reach of strategic bombing until spring of 1944. B-29s of the XX Bomber Command based in India were able to reach Kyushu, the southernmost island of Japan, by using intermediate refueling bases near Cheng-tu, China. The fuel stored at Cheng-tu had to be brought over the Himalayas from India. It took 12 gallons of gas to bring one gallon to Cheng-tu. My father-in-law was a radar operator who took part in these operations. All participants were well aware of the futility of this bizarre arrangement, but they recognized the importance of keeping Chang Kai-Shek focused on fighting the Japanese and not the Chinese Communists.
Command of XX Bomber Command changed several times, as their operations were not very successful. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs “Hap” Arnold initially named himself Commander to keep it out of the hands of local commanders. After he suffered a heart attack, Brigadier General Heywood “Possum” Hansell took over. General Kenneth Wolfe then shepherded the B-29 through production and initial deployment in May 1944, but was replaced by General Laverne “Blondie” Saunders, who was in turn replaced by General Curtis LeMay. While in India-China, LeMay’s results were no better than Wolfe’s or Saunders’. Daylight precision bombing seemed to be a failure.
LeMay had had some experience with area fire-bombing when he bombed Hankow (now Wuhan), China in December, 1944. My father-in-law participated in that raid as well. They bombed using radar instead of visually. Hankow is at the intersection of several rivers, making a very confusing radar picture. My father-in-law said he thought he had accidently bombed the forces of Chiang-kai Shek, but it turned out to be Japanese forces that he bombed, and he was hailed as a hero.
Finally, in August 1944, the Mariana Islands were secured and the B-29s had an easily supplied base from which they could strike all of Japan. “Possum” Hansell was in charge initially of XXI Bomber Command on the Marianas. Again, precision daylight bombing did not work well. XXI Bomber Command discovered the jet stream, a high-level, very fast air current that in some cases was so powerful that the B-29s’ ground speed was negative, i.e., they were flying backward. Bombing from high altitude did not work because the bombs were blown sideways out of the field of the Norden bomb sight. Curtis LeMay replaced Hansell, in the incident described carefully by Gladwell.
That was the end of daylight precision bombing of Japan. The next target was to be Tokyo. LeMay decided to attack at low altitude, at night, using the newly developed, highly effective napalm. In March, 1945, XXI Bomber Command attacked Tokyo in what Gladwell calls the “Longest Night of the Second World War.” This was to be Bomber Harris doctrine in spades. Gladwell’s description of that night is extremely vivid. He does leave out the little-known fact that one of the on-the-ground participants was 12-year-old Yoko Ono, who survived the firebombing in a special bunker.
Of course the ultimate event in contrast with precision bombing was the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There is very little need for precision when the bomb is going to vaporize the target city.
So you might think, well, the discussion is over. Damage-limiting precision bombing is a failure. Bomber Harris was right. But these days, with bombs guided by global positioning system or lasers, the idea of dropping a 500-pounder into a pickle barrel is no longer fantasy.
Caldwell makes a few technical gaffes that other reviewers have commented on: that the B-29s needed a “tailwind” to get in the air; that both atomic bombs were carried by Enola Gay. I don’t think these are very important compared to the excellent overview of the pursuit, successes, and failures of the strategies.